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I. INTRODUCTION
In a twenty-eight year coaching career, Jerry Tarkanian had
achieved the winningest career record of any coach in the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). Tarkanian became the head
basketball coach at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV)
in 1973, and in just four years Tarkanian had transformed a team
with a mediocre 14-14 record into a 29-3 powerhouse that finished
third in the NCAA Basketball Tournament. Tarkanian was at the
pinnacle of collegiate coaching. As the coach of a successful "big-
time" collegiate sports team, Tarkanian received many lucrative ben-
1
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efits which were contingent upon remaining the head basketball coach
at UNLV.'
Tarkanian faced the loss of these substantial benefits because of
a two-year suspension levied against him by UNLV in response to
an NCAA report issued by the NCAA Committee on Infractions
that implicated Tarkanian in recruiting violations. The Committee
on Infractions had already placed the school on a two year period
of probation (no television or post-season games during this period)
and asked UNLV to show cause why more severe penalties should
not be applied if Tarkanian were not removed from the basketball
program during the probation period.2
Rather than face removal from the athletic department and a
drastic pay cut to a regular professor's salary of $53,000, Tarkanian
sought an injunction against UNLV (the NCAA was subsequently
added as a necessary party) in Nevada court to prevent his suspen-
sion. Tarkanian brought the injunction action pursuant to section
1983 of Chapter 42 of the United States Code,3 which provides the
1. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 456 (1988).
The NCAA is an unincorporated association comprised of approximately 960 members,
including virtually all public and private universities and four-year colleges conducting major
athletic programs in the United States. Basic policies of the NCAA are determined by the
members at annual conventions. Between conventions, the Association is governed by its
Council, which appoints various committees to implement specific programs.
Id. at 457.
One of the NCAA's fundamental policies "is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body, and by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between college athletics and
professional sports." It has therefore adopted "legislation," governing the conduct of the
intercollegiate athletic programs of its members. This NCAA legislation applies to a variety
of issues, such as academic standards for eligibility, admissions, financial aid, and the
recruiting of student athletes. By joining the NCAA, each member agrees to abide by and
to enforce such rules.
Id.
Tarkanian, a tenured professor at UNLV, received a $125,000 salary (in lieu of a regular
professor salary of $53,000), 10% of the net proceeds received by UNLV in NCAA-authorized cham-
pionship games, fees from basketball camps and clinics, product endorsements, a newspaper column,
and The Jerry Tarkanian Show on both radio and television. Id. at 456 n.l.
2. Id. at 459.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) provides, in part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory ... subjects ... any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
[Vol. 92
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statutory cause of action for violations of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. Tarkanian asserted that inadequate NCAA proceedings
had deprived him of property without the due process of law re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
4
Section 1983 provides that in order to recover under the statute,
the conduct at issue must have occurred "under the color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory." 5 The United States Supreme Court refers to the section
1983 test as whether the action is "under the color of state law.' '6
The Supreme Court established in 1966, 7 and reaffirmed in 1982,8
that in a section 1983 case, the requirement of "under the color of
state law" is identical to the "state-action" requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Because the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens . . . ,',9 the Court has de-
termined that in order for the Fourteenth Amendment to be ap-
plicable, there must be state action involved.10
A section 1983 claim consists of three factors: 1) a Constitutional
component; 2) the underlying Fourteenth Amendment violation; and
3) the statutory component of "under color of state law." The Four-
teenth Amendment violation can only occur when state action is
present. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the section
1983 "under the color of state law" requirement is identical to the
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceedings for redress.
4. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 456.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
6. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982); United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 794 (1966).
7. Price, 383 U.S. at 794.
8. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 928.
9. Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § I.
10. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
1990]
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state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment." The res-
olution of a section 1983 claim is therefore reduced to the issue of
state action.
For Tarkanian to prevail in his section 1983 claim, the Court
had to find that the action that deprived Tarkanian of his property
constituted state action. 12 In his section 1983 claim, Tarkanian al-
leged an underlying Constitutional violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights that occurred "under the color of
state law." There was no question that UNLV, a state university,
was a state entity and any action by it was state action. The question
in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian3 was whether the
action taken by the NCAA prior to the state action of UNLV would
also be deemed state action.
This note will examine the Tarkanian decision and focus upon
whether the NCAA is properly viewed as a private or a state actor.
First, it will give an overview of National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
v. Tarkanian. Second, it will trace the development of the state-
action doctrine from the original strict requirement of actual state
action to the various theories of finding state action in the conduct
of apparently private actors. Third, it will examine the Supreme
Court's opinion in Tarkanian with a discussion of both the majority
and dissenting opinions. Finally, this note will analyze the role that
Tarkanian plays in the development of state action jurisprudence
and comment upon the validity of the private/state dichotomy in
Fourteenth Amendment law.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts of National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian
In 1976, the NCAA Committee on Infractions initiated an of-
ficial inquiry into alleged recruiting violations of student athletes at
UNLV. The official inquiry was based upon information gleaned
11. Price, 383 U.S. at 787.
12. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 456.
13. Id. at 454.
[Vol. 92
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from the Committee's own preliminary investigation. At the request
of the NCAA Committee on Infractions, UNLV conducted its own
investigation in which it concluded that UNLV and Tarkanian were
guilty of no wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the Committee on Infractions
found that UNLV committed 38 violations of NCAA rules, including
ten violations committed by Tarkanian personally. 14 The Committee
on Infractions proposed that UNLV be placed on two years of pro-
bation in which the school would be barred from post-season tour-
naments and would not appear on television. The Committee on
Infractions further requested UNLV to show cause why additional
penalties should not be imposed if UNLV failed to remove Tar-
kanian from the athletic program during the two year probationary
period.'
Subsequent to the filing of the NCAA report, the vice-president
of UNLV conducted a hearing to determine whether the NCAA
sanctions would be adopted. Although the vice-president expressed
doubt about the sufficiency of the evidence, he concluded: "given
the terms of our adherence to the NCAA we cannot substitute-
biased as we must be-our own judgment on the credibility of wit-
nesses for that of the infractions committee and Council.' ' 6 The
vice-president proposed three alternative courses of action for UNLV
to take: 1) reject the NCAA sanction requiring UNLV to disassociate
Tarkanian from the athletic department and risk heavier sanctions;
2) recognize the NCAA sanction and suspend Tarkanian even though
the NCAA was wrong; or 3) pull out of the NCAA. The president
of UNLV accepted option two and suspended Tarkanian.1
7
14. Id. at 459. Some of the ten alleged violations of NCAA rules by Tarkanian included: (I)
Tarkanian allegedly engaged booster, and part-time professor, Harvey Munford, to give player David
Vaughan credit for a "B" in a class in which he did not attend or perform any of the class re-
quirements. (2) Tarkanian allegedly arranged for free airline tickets, free clothing, and free meals at
the Las Vegas Hilton for players Robert "Jeep" Kelley and Ricky Sobers in violation of the "Extra
Benefit to Student Athletes" provision of NCAA Constitution section 3-1-(g)-(6). (3) Tarkanian in-
terfered with the conduct of the investigation and through pressure and intimidation sought to prevent
players "Jeep" Kelley and Ricky Sobers from discussing violations with NCAA investigators. (4)
Tarkanian allegedly put pressure on four players to give false information. Brief for Appellant at
141, 152, NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
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B. Posture
The day before his suspension became effective, Tarkanian
brought an action in Nevada state court for declaratory and in-
junctive relief against UNLV based upon a violation of Chapter 42,
section 1983 of the United States Code. Tarkanian alleged that UNLV
had acted "under the color of state law" in depriving him of prop-
erty and liberty without the due process guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution. Tarkanian asserted that he
had been deprived of his coaching position, which would result in
the loss of property-loss of $72,000 in salary; loss of 10% of any
championship game revenue; and loss of his radio show, personal
appearance fees, clinic revenues and endorsements. Tarkanian fur-
ther asserted that this deprivation of property occurred as a result
of NCAA hearings and investigations that were allegedly arbitrary
and capricious; therefore, the hearings did not afford the procedural
and substantive due process required by the Constitution."8
This Constitutional violation formed the basis for Tarkanian's
section 1983 claim for injunctive relief. The trial court enjoined
UNLV from suspending Tarkanian because Tarkanian had been de-
nied procedural and substantive due process of law. UNLV appealed
this ruling. 9 On appeal, the NCAA filed an amicus curiae brief
which asserted that no controversy existed between UNLV and Tar-
kanian and if a controversy did exist, the NCAA was a necessary
party to the litigation. The Nevada Supreme Court held that there
was a legitimate controversy, but agreed that the NCAA was a nec-
essary party to the action. The case was reversed and remanded to
allow joinder of the NCAA. 20
Tarkanian amended his complaint to add the NCAA. A Federal
District Court rejected the NCAA's attempt to remove the case to
Federal Court because UNLV had earlier waived any right to remove
the case.2' The Nevada trial court held that the NCAA conduct was
state action for constitutional purposes and that its decision was
18. Id.
19. Id.
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capricious and arbitrary. The court continued its injunction barring
Tarkanian's suspension and further enjoined the NCAA from con-
ducting additional proceedings against UNLV. The NCAA appealed
the decision while UNLV did not.
22
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the NCAA had en-
gaged in state action and that Tarkanian had been deprived of both
property and liberty without due process of law.23 The court based
its conclusion upon three arguments: 1) because many of the schools
comprising the NCAA are public or government-supported, any reg-
ulatory action by the NCAA is state action; 2) the discipline of a
state employee is a traditional state function which has been dele-
gated to the NCAA by UNLV, rendering the NCAA a state actor;
3) the NCAA was a state actor because it engaged in joint action
with UNLV to impose sanctions on Tarkanian. 4 The Nevada court
applied the state action test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,25 which held that a private actor
engaged in joint conduct with a state entity becomes a state actor
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari26 and held
that the NCAA was not a state actor and therefore was not subject
to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 The judgment of
the Nevada Supreme Court was reversed, and the case was remanded
for further proceedings.
III. PRIOR LAw IN A NUTSHELL
Chapter 42, section 1983 of the United States Code provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
22. Id.
23. Id.; Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987).
24. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 462.
25. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Because the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No State shall
... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process," courts hold that state
action is required before conduct becomes subject to the scrutiny of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
26. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 108 S. Ct. 1011 (1988).
27. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
1990]
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to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law for redress. 2
A. Under the Color of State Law
Section 1983 requires that the deprivation of a Constitutional
right (in the Tarkanian case there is an alleged Fourteenth Amend-
ment violation) must occur "under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory .... - 29 The
United States Supreme Court refers to this test as "under color of
state law" in the section 1983 case law.30 The Court's phrase is a
narrower formulation than the text of the statute. 31 For example,
the Court in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,32 the Court found that
a showing of custom and usage still required the showing of state
involvement. A literal reading of the statute, however, would in-
dicate that the mere showing of a custom or usage would be suf-
ficient for liability under the statute.33
In United States v. Price,34 the United States Supreme Court
explicitly stated that "in cases under section 1983, under color of
law has consistently been treated as the same thing as state action
required under the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 35 The Court reiterated
in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. ,36 that the requirements for "under
the color of state law" in section 1983 are identical to the state
action requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 In determining
whether the conduct of a defendant is "under the color of state
law" in order to establish liability pursuant to section 1983, it is
necessary to satisfy the state action requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979).
29. Id.
30. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
794 (1966).
31. Comment, The Supreme Court Corrals A Runaway, 34 MERCER L. REv. 1073 (1983).
32. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
33. Id. at 167-68.
34. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
35. Id. at 794 n.7.
36. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
37. Id. at 929.
[Vol. 92
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B. State Action
Justice Stevens noted in Tarkanian that "[e]mbedded in our
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state
action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendment's Due
Process Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment
affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be."
38
Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not generally extend to
private conduct, the state action requirement "preserves an area of
individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law, and avoids
the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it could not
control." 39
The Supreme Court established the private/state dichotomy in
the Civil Rights Cases in 1883.40 In a series of decisions invalidating
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment phrase "no State shall. . ." means that deprivation of
Constitutional rights by the government is forbidden while private
action of the same nature is not.41 In cases decided within a few
years after the Civil Rights Cases, the Court employed a literal def-
inition of "state action" which required that acts had to be literally
authorized and undertaken by the state in order for Fourteenth
Amendment protections to be triggered. 42
1. Public Function Theory
In the 1940's, the Supreme Court expanded the boundaries of
the state action concept by subjecting seemingly private actors to
the constitutional guarantees usually applicable only to govern-
ment. 43 The Supreme Court has employed two primary Constitu-
tional theories that subject private parties to the strictures of the
Fourteenth Amendment in certain circumstances. 44
38. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 461.
39. Id.
40. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
41. Id. at 11.
42. Davis, The Supreme Court: Finding State Action... Sometimes, 26 How. L.J. 1395, 1397
(1983).
43. G. GtTHER, CONSTrTIONAL LAw 867 (1985).
44. Id. at 865-867.
9
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The " 'public function' analysis treats private enterprises whose
'operation is essentially a public function' as sufficiently state-like
to be treated as a state for purposes of applying constitutional guar-
antees. '45 In 1946 in Marsh v. Alabama46 the United States Supreme
Court held for the first time that a private party was subject to the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that a
company-owned town which took on all of the functions and char-
acteristics of a regular public municipality was subject to the due
process requirements of the Constitution.47 Marsh, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness, was convicted of criminal trespass because he distributed re-
ligious literature, without permission, in a town owned by a
corporation. Because the company town was open for use by the
public, the rights of the private corporate owners became circum-
scribed by the rights of the people that used the town. 48 The Con-
stitutional rights of the owners of the property had to be balanced
with rights (of the people using the town) to freedom of religion
and press; the rights of the people were held to take precedence. 49
The company town took on all of the functions and characteristics
of a public municipality; therefore, the town was a state actor under
the "public function" theory. Hence, the company town could not
prohibit Marsh from distributing religious literature because the town
was subject to the guarantees of the First Amendment.
In 1968 the Court applied the public function theory of Marsh
in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza Inc.50
In Logan Valley, labor union picketers were charged with trespass
45. Id. at 867.
46. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
47. Id. at 508.
48. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 501.
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. Thus, the owners
of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely
as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit
the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state
regulation.
Id. at 506.
49. Id. at 509.
50. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
[Vol. 92
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upon a shopping center's property. Justice Marshall's majority opin-
ion held that a shopping center is the "functional equivalent" to
the business district in the company town involved in Marsh.5 1 The
shopping center was therefore held to be a state actor pursuant to
the public function theory and was subject to Constitutional guar-
antees; the use of state trespass laws to exclude individuals from a
private shopping center violates those individuals' Constitutional
rights .12
2. Nexus Theory
The "nexus" theory "seeks to identify sufficient points of con-
tact between the private actor and the state to justify imposing con-
stitutional restraints on the private actor or commanding state
disentanglement." 53 The Court first utilized the "nexus" theory in
Shelley v. Kraemer.5 4 In Shelley, Caucasian property owners sought
state judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in order
to enjoin black purchasers from taking possession of real property
and to divest them of title.5 5 The state courts granted this relief.
The United States Supreme Court held that the action of the state
court to uphold the restrictive covenant was state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 6 Although the covenants were between pri-
vate property owners, once the state court made its full coercive
power available to enforce the discriminatory covenants, the state
unconstitutionally participated in denying the enjoyment of property
rights on the basis of race.57 The involvement of the state judiciary
with the private property owners in upholding the covenants pro-
vided a sufficient "nexus" between the state conduct and the private
conduct to find state action. The Constitution therefore barred the
enforcement of the discriminatory private covenants.
51. Id. at 318.
52. Id. at 319-20.
53. G. GUnTrER, supra note 43, at 867.
54. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 19-20.
57. Id. at 20-21.
1990]
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In 1961, the Supreme Court held in Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Auth.5 8 that a private restaurant's refusal to serve blacks con-
stituted discriminatory state action based upon the fact that the
restaurant was located in a publicly owned building. The Wilmington
Parking Authority constructed and owned a public parking facility
and leased space to the Eagle restaurant because the projected re-
venues from parking cars and the sale of bonds would not fully
finance the project.5 9 The state thus benefitted from the profits of
the restaurant, whose proprietors asserted that "to serve Negroes
would hurt its business." 6 Profits earned by discrimination not only
contributed to, but were indispensable elements in, the financial suc-
cess of a governmental agency.61 The Fourteenth Amendment ap-
plied because the state had made itself a party to the refusal of
service and had placed its power, property and prestige behind the
discrimination. 62 The state had placed itself in a position of inter-
dependence with the restaurant and must be recognized as a joint
participant in the discrimination; this was not purely private dis-
crimination.63 The state had sufficiently entwined itself in the private
conduct to render that conduct state action. 4
The joint participant theory, a sub-specie of the nexus theory,
provides that private parties can be found to be state actors when
they jointly engage with state officials in Constitutionally prohibited
action.6 - As in the other "nexus cases," the crucial factor in joint
participant cases is the degree to which the action of the state is
intertwined with the conduct of the private actor; by acting jointly
with the state, the private party is considered a state actor. 66
In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,67 the Supreme Court held that
a private party's joint participation with a state official in a con-
58. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
59. Id. at 724.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 725.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 931; Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152.
66. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152.
67. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
[Vol. 92
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spiracy to racially discriminate would constitute state action. Adickes
was a white school teacher who, in the company of six black pupils,
was refused service in a restaurant. 68 Upon leaving the restaurant,
a city police officer arrested Adickes on a groundless charge of va-
grancy and took her into custody. Adickes alleged that Kress and
the city police conspired to deprive her of her rights to enjoy equal
treatment and service in a place of public accommodation. 69 The
Court held that the joint act of conspiracy between the private party
and the city police officer was sufficient to constitute state action.
70
C. Position of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
In the 1970's and 1980's the Supreme Court curtailed both the
public function and the nexus theories of state action.71 The Burger
Court sought to circumscribe the scope of the state action concept
by: 1) limiting the public function doctrine to traditional public func-
tions exclusively reserved to the state; and 2) requiring some form
of affirmative coercion or action by the state to satisfy the "nexus"
test.72
The Burger Court narrowed the ambit of the "nexus" theory in
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.73 The Moose Lodge, a private club,
refused to serve Irvis, a black guest of a club member. The Court
held that the fact that the state granted a liquor license to the club
did not transform the racial discrimination of the private club into
state action.74 The state was not sufficiently implicated in the dis-
criminatory practices of the lodge because: 1) the decision to dis-
criminate could not be attributed to any governmental decision, and
2) the governmental action that did affect the lodge-granting of
the liquor license-was wholly unrelated to the discrimination. 7 The
Court adamantly refused to hold:
68. Id. at 149.
69. Id. at 149-50.
70. Id. at 148.
71. G. GUTHErR, supra note 43, at 872, 900.
72. Id.
73. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 175.
1990]
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[that] discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal
Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at
all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever
.... Since state-furnished services include such necessities of life such as elec-
tricity, water, and police and fire protection, such a holding would utterly emas-
culate the distinction between private as distinguished from state conduct set forth
in the Civil Rights Cases.
6
In 1974 the Court limited the scope of the public function theory
by holding in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.77 that a private
entity will be a state actor only if it engages in "powers traditionally
exclusively reserved to the states." ' 78 Metropolitan Edison terminated
the electric service of Jackson because she did not pay her electric
bill. Jackson argued that state action was present because Edison
provided an essential public service required by law to be supplied
reasonably and continuously. 79 The Court declined to expand the
public function theory into a broad principle that all businesses af-
fected with public interest are state actors in all their actions. 0 A
heavily regulated, privately owned utility is not a state actor because
the provision of electricity is not exclusively reserved to the state-
despite the fact that the utility enjoyed a partial monopoly.8'
In 1976 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Hudgens v.
NLRB, s2 overruled Logan Valley and held that a shopping center
does not perform a public function traditionally reserved exclusively
to the state. Like Logan Valley, Hudgens involved labor picketers
who were charged with trespass upon a shopping center's property.
Private property should only be treated as public when the property
possesses all of the attributes of a public town; a shopping center
did not have all of the attributes of a public town and should not
be treated as a state actor under the public function theory.83 The
public function argument was therefore curtailed once more as the
76. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
77. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
78. Id. at 352-53.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 359.
81. Id. at 358.
82. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
83. Id. at 516-21.
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Court directly overruled an eight-year-old case involving almost
identical facts.
In Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, another "nexus" case, the Court
held that a state is responsible for the act of a private party only
when the state compels an unconstitutional act. The state's mere
acquiescence in a private act does not convert it into state action.
Brooks was evicted from her apartment, and the city marshal ar-
ranged for Brooks' possessions to be stored at the Flagg Brothers
warehouse even though the cost of storage was more than Brooks
wanted to pay.85 Following a series of disputes concerning the stor-
age charges which Brooks failed to pay, Flagg Brothers, pursuant
to a state warehouseman's lien statute,86 gave Brooks ten days to
pay the bill or the furniture would be sold. Brooks then brought a
section 1983 claim. The Court found no violation of section 1983
because a warehouseman's sale of bailed goods to satisfy a ware-
houseman's lien pursuant to a state statute was not state action.87
Although the state had enacted the statute, the state did not compel
the sale of the goods. 8 The Court required affirmative coercive ac-
tion rather than inactive acquiescence in order for state action to
exist.8 9
The United States Supreme Court rendered two opinions in 1982
that further restricted the application of due process restraints upon
private actors. Considered together, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn9° and
Blum v. Yaretsky9' stand for the proposition that state financial
support of a private entity, without some other state coercion or
encouragement to commit some objectionable act, does not consti-
tute the state involvement necessary to convert these actions into
state action.92
84. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
85. Id. at 153.
86. N.Y. U.C.C. § 7-210 (McKinney 1964).
87. Flagg, 436 U.S. at 153.
88. Id. at 166.
89. Id. at 164-66.
90. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
91. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
92. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841.
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In Blum, the Court found that decisions by private nursing homes
to transfer Medicaid patients from higher care "skilled nurse fa-
cilities" to lower care and less expensive "health related facilities"
did not constitute state action despite the fact that the homes are
regulated and receive reimbursement from the state. 93 The Medicaid
patients claimed that they had been transferred without due process
of law.94 The Court held that the transfer decisions were medical
judgments by private physicians using professional standards not
established by the state.95 The mere fact that the state subsidized
the hospital, licensed it, and paid the medical expenses of 90% of
the patients did not convert the decisions into state action.96 The
state will "be held responsible for a private decision only when it
has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant en-
couragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be
deemed to be that of the State." 97
Similarly, in Rendell-Baker, the Court held that a private school's
firing of an employee was not state action despite the fact that
government funding was the major source of the school's financial
resources. 98 The private school for behaviorally disturbed students
received 90 to 99 percent of its funding from the state.99 Rendell-
Baker was dismissed following a protest concerning school policies.
She alleged that her First Amendment rights had been abridged by
the discharge and that the state was implicated due to the funding.
The Court quoted Blum's requirement that the state must exercise
coercive power in order to find state action. 1' ° In Rendell-Baker, the
private school was not a state actor because the decision to discharge
employees was not compelled or even influenced by any state reg-
ulation. 01
93. Blum, 457 U.S. at 994.
94. Id. at 996.
95. Id. at 1008.
96. Id. at 1011.
97. Id. at 1004.
98. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41.
99. Id. at 832.
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Despite the Court's steadfast adherence to its trend of limiting
the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to private parties,
one significant exception to this trend has been the joint participant
cases. In Dennis v. Sparks,02 the Court found that private persons
who had bribed a judge to issue an injunction were illegally engaged
in joint action and were therefore state actors subject to liability
under section 1983. A Texas judge had issued an injunction pro-
hibiting the production of oil on oil leases owned by Sparks. Sparks
claimed that the injunction had been corruptly issued due to a con-
spiracy between the private defendant and the judge, thus causing
a deprivation of property without due process. 103 The Court found
that the private actors became state actors who acted under the color
of state law as a result of their conspiracy with a state actor, the
judge, to engage in unlawful conduct. 104
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 01 the Court held by a 5 to 4
majority that a private party who had invoked a procedurally de-
fective state attachment statute had engaged in state action by acting
jointly with state officials to deprive a citizen of his due process
rights. Unlike Adickes or Dennis, Lugar did not involve a conspiracy
to do something that was clearly illegal.'0 The Edmondson Oil Com-
pany invoked what it perceived to be a Constitutional state attach-
ment procedure which was subsequently held to be unconstitutional.
Lugar, the operator of a truck-stop was indebted to his fuel supplier,
Edmondson Oil Company. In attempting to enforce the debt from
Lugar, Edmondson Oil Company sought pre-trial attachment of Lu-
gar's property pursuant to a Virginia statute. 10 7 The pre-judgment
attachment procedure required that Edmondson allege in an ex parte
proceeding a belief that Lugar was disposing of or might dispose
of his property in order to defeat his creditors. The attachment was
later dismissed because the plaintiff had failed to show that Lugar
102. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id.
105. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
106. Id. at 922.
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had attempted to dispose of his property to defeat his creditors. 108
Lugar then brought a section 1983 action, asserting that Edmondson
had acted jointly with the state to deprive him of his property with-
out due process of law.'09 The attachment statute was held to be
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 10 Writing for the majority, Justice White held that by
invoking this unconstitutional statute, Edmondson Oil acted jointly
with the state, which had created and enforced the statute, to deny
a third party of due process."'
Justice Powell, in a vigorous dissent, argued that it was unjust
and illogical to hold that a private person was a state actor as a
joint participant when a statute invoked was later ruled unconsti-
tutional."2 A private act followed by an objectionable state act does
not logically transform the private actor into a state actor:
[R]espondent's private action was followed by state action.... But '[t]hat the
State responds to [private] actions by [taking action of its own] does not render
it responsible for those [private] actions.' And where the State is not responsible
for a private decision to behave in a certain way, the private action generally
cannot be considered 'state action' within the meaning of our cases.'
Furthermore, Justice Powell argued that the other joint participant
cases such as Adickes and Dennis involved charges of conspiracy
"with state officials to secure the application of a state law so plainly
unconstitutional as to enjoy no presumption of validity. ' " 4 Thus,
"in such a context, the private party could be characterized as hiding
behind the authority of law and as engaging in joint participation
with the State in the deprivation of constitutional rights.'"'i A hold-
ing that the private party was a state actor due to joint participation
was unwarranted in Edmondson because the litigant merely invoked
a statutory process that had never been constitutionally questioned.
108. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 940-41.
111. Id. at 941.
112. Id. at 944, 955-56 (Powell, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 949.
115. Id. at 955 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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In cases involving the NCAA prior to the Supreme Court de-
cisions of Rendell-Baker and Blum (which have apparently narrowed
the scope of state action), the federal circuit courts had uniformly
held that the NCAA was a state actor.'1 6 The NCAA was a state
actor because state universities and other government entities played
a major role in its policy formulation and in its funding. Under
these rulings, the NCAA was a state actor whether it was dealing
with a private or a state institution.
As a result of Rendell-Baker and Blum, which rejected the notion
that the state funding of a private organization, without more, could
result in a finding of state action by the private entity, the circuit
courts changed their stance on the disposition of NCAA cases.
11 7
The circuit courts began to hold that the NCAA was not a state
actor when the only indicia of state involvement with the NCAA
was the funding by state schools. The circuit courts recognized that
the Supreme Court cases required that in order to find state action,
the state must have coerced or encouraged the NCAA's decision to
the extent that it was essentially the state's choice. For example, in
McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,"18 there was no
showing that the state was responsible for the NCAA's formulation
of eligibility rules; therefore, the NCAA's actions were not state
action. '9
IV. ANALYSIS OF NCAA v. TARKANL.N
A. Majority Opinion
The Court, in a 5-4 majority, held that the NCAA was not a
state actor and therefore did not act under the color of state law
116. See Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 560 F.2d 352 (8th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510
F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.
1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
117. See McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Kar-
manos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804
F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986); Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir.
1984).
118. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
119. Id. at 1346.
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for the purposes of a section 1983 claim. 120 Justice Stevens, writing
for the Court, indicated that "imn this case the under color of law
requirement of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and the state action require-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment are equivalent.' ' 2 1 This state-
ment is consistent with Price and Lugar which held that the "under
color" requirement and the "state action" requirement were iden-
tical. Therefore, in order to resolve the section 1983 claim, the Court
examined whether the NCAA engaged in state action when it con-
ducted its investigation and recommended that Tarkanian be dis-
ciplined.
1. Mirror Image of State Action
The Majority noted that Tarkanian presented a mirror image of
the usual state action situation and that the Court was required to
"step through an analytical looking glass to resolve it. ' ' 122 In the
typical state action case, a private actor has engaged in harmful,
discriminatory conduct. The question then became whether the state
has sufficiently entwined itself with the private discriminatory con-
duct so that the conduct is deemed state action and is subject to
Constitutional prohibitions.1 3
In Tarkanian, the private action of the NCAA to recommend
Tarkanian's suspension preceded the state action of UNLV to sus-
pend the coach. There was no question that state action was present
in this case because the suspension of a state employee by a state
university clearly constituted state action.' 4 The question became
whether the clear state action of UNLV to suspend Tarkanian in
compliance with the previous NCAA recommendations transformed
the preceding NCAA conduct into state action? The Court stated
fhat it required an "analytical looking glass" to resolve the question
of whether the Court would look beyond the conduct of UNLV to
120. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 456. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy joined. Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined.
121. Id. at 457 n.4.
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hold that the previous related private conduct of the NCAA was
also state action subject to due process constraints. 12
The Court first examined UNLV's role in promulgating the rules
of the NCAA. While the Court stated that UNLV had some impact
on the policies of the NCAA, the hundreds of other schools making
up the collective membership of the NCAA also had input. 126 The
vast majority of the collective members are from states other than
Nevada, and these schools did not act under the color of Nevada
law in promulgating the NCAA rules. 127 Therefore, "it necessarily
follows that the source of the legislation adopted by the NCAA is
not Nevada but the collective membership, speaking through an or-
ganization that is independent of any state.
' 1 2
Stevens then rejected the proposition that merely because UNLV
embraced the NCAA's rules, the rules became state rules and the
NCAA was transformed into a state actor. 29 The Court analogized
NCAA rule-making with the rules promulgated by the American Bar
Association (ABA) in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.30 In Bates,
the action of the state supreme court in adopting and enforcing the
ABA rules was state action, while the ABA's formulation of those
disciplinary rules was not state action because the state court retained
the power to reject those rules and promulgate its own standards.1
3 '
Similarly, in Tarkanian, the actions by UNLV to adopt and enforce
NCAA-formulated rules was state action, but the NCAA was not
a state actor because while the NCAA made the rules, UNLV was
free to reject the rules, free to seek to amend the rules, or free to
withdraw from the NCAA.
3 2
2. Public Function Analysis
The majority noted that the NCAA did not possess the power





129. Id. at 463.
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with UNLV and Tarkanian. 133 "The NCAA enjoyed no govern-
mental powers to facilitate its investigation. It had no power to
subpoena witnesses, impose contempt sanctions, or to assert sov-
ereign authority over any individual.' ' 34 Therefore, it was not ap-
propriate to view the NCAA as a state actor.135
The Court rejected Tarkanian's claim that the NCAA's conduct
was state action because UNLV had delegated powers to the
NCAA. 36 Under the "public function" or "traditional government
powers" theory cases such as Marsh, Jackson, and Hudgens, if the
NCAA had assumed a traditional exclusive government power, it
would be a state actor subject to the Constitution. Tarkanian argued
that the NCAA had taken on the traditional exclusive government
power to discipline state employees because of a delegation of power
from the state.13 7 The delegation of state authority to a private party
can result in a finding that the private actor is actually a state actor.'
However, "UNLV delegated no power to the NCAA to take specific
action against any University employee.' 1 39 The only power pos-
sessed by the NCAA was to levy sanctions upon UNLV if the school
did not comply with the NCAA request.Y° The power to suspend
Tarkanian still resided solely in UNLV because NCAA rules pro-
hibited the Association from taking any direct disciplinary action
against a coach or any other member university employee. 141 The
University still had the power to retain Tarkanian in defiance of the
NCAA request, at the risk of heavier NCAA sanctions. 4 2 Since there
133. Id. at 465.
134. Id. at 464-65.
135. Id. at 465.
136. Id. at 463-64. Tarkanian argued that since UNLV had agreed to adhere to NCAA rules,
UNLV had delegated power to the NCAA to take specific action against a University employee. Id.
He argued that a state that delegates authority to a private party may thereby make that party a
state actor. Id. (citing West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988)). In Tarkanian, however, the Court
held that UNLV did not delegate authority to the NCAA to take action against Tarkanian and
therefore the NCAA did not become a state actor because of delegation of authority from a state
entity. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464.
137. Id. at 465 n.18.
138. Id. at 464.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 465 n.18.
142. Id. at 465.
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was no delegation of governmental powers from UNLV to the
NCAA, the NCAA did not possess traditional exclusive govern-
mental powers and was therefore not a state actor pursuant to the
"public function theory."
3. The Nexus Theory and Its Sub-Specie
The Court then held that there was no joint participation between
the NCAA and UNLV because the interests of the two parties were
adverse:
UNLV used its best efforts to retain its winning coach-a goal diametrically op-
posed to the NCAA's interests in ascertaining the truth of its investigator's re-
ports.... [Tihe NCAA and UNLV acted much more like adversaries than like
partners engaged in a dispassionate search for the truth.... Just as a state-
compensated public defender acts in a private capacity when she represents a
private client in a conflict against the State, the NCAA is properly viewed as a
private actor at odds with the State when it represents the interests of its entire
membership in an investigation of one public.
143
The Court points out that in other joint participant cases the in-
terests of the state and the private party were not adverse. 144 The
Court noted that in Burton the lease arrangement between the res-
taurant and the parking authority was mutually beneficial-the res-
taurant received tax exemptions, the parking authority received rent,
and business increased for both parties.1 45 A mutual benefit was also
found in Dennis, where the judge (the state) received a bribe for
issuing an improper injunction and the private party benefitted from
the issuance of the injunction.
Justice Stevens echoed the dissent of Justice Powell in Lugar by
arguing that the joint participant theory should not be applied in
the absence of an improper agreement between the state and the
private party.' 46 Both Dennis and Adickes involved conspiracies to
143. Id. at 464. The Joint Participant Theory holds that "private parties could be found to be
state actors, if they were 'jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action."' Id. at 466
(White, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 464 n.16.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 464 n.17.
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violate Constitutional rights from the very beginning of the rela-
tionship between the state and the private persons. 1
47
In Tarkanian, the Court found that there was no impropriety in
the agreement between the NCAA and UNLV that the university
would abide by NCAA rules. 148 This was not a conspiracy between
UNLV and the NCAA to deprive Tarkanian of his due process rights.
Because the NCAA and UNLV acted at odds throughout the in-
vestigation and later litigation, rather than for the mutual benefit
of each party, and because the NCAA and UNLV did not conspire
to violate Tarkanian's rights, the "joint participation" theory did
not convert the NCAA into a state actor.
Finally, the Court found that even if, as Tarkanian asserted, the
NCAA had so much power that UNLV had no choice but to accept
its sanctions, it does not automatically follow that the NCAA is a
state actor or acting under the color of state law. 149 "In the final
analysis the question is whether 'the conduct allegedly causing the
deprivation of a federal right [can] be fairly attributable to the
State.""1150 This is the standard enunciated in Lugar.' The Court
in Irvis required that in order to find state action in a private party,
the private discriminatory conduct must be attributable to a gov-
ernmental decision.
In Flagg Bros., Blum, and Rendell-Baker, the Court required
that the state must exercise coercive power over or provide signif-
icant encouragement to the private discriminatory party before the
state would be implicated in the discrimination. Only then would
the private actor be considered a state actor. Considering the fact
that UNLV and its counsel, including the Nevada Attorney General,
opposed the NCAA at nearly every turn throughout the proceedings,
the Court found that "[it would be ironic indeed to conclude that
147. In Dennis, the private party and the judge conspired to issue an improper injunction that
deprived the respondent of property without due process. In Adickes, the police and a private res-
taurant conspired to deprive Adickes of her rights to enjoy equal treatment and service in a place
of public accommodation.
148. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464 n.17.
149. Id. at 465.
150. Id.
151. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
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the NCAA's imposition of sanctions against UNLV . . . is fairly
attributable to the State of Nevada. 11 52 The NCAA imposed its sanc-
tions independently of any action by UNLV. Because the NCAA
sanctions occurred before the action of UNLV, it cannot be said
that the NCAA sanctions were imposed because of a governmental
decision or any coercive state action. Therefore, the NCAA was not
a state actor, nor did the NCAA act "under color" of state law.
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice White, writing for the dissent argued that the NCAA is
a state actor because it jointly participated with state officials to
deprive Tarkanian of his due process rights. The dissent points out
that "the situation presented by this case is not unknown to us and
certainly is not unique." 153 In Adickes, and Dennis, the court "faced
the question of whether private parties could be held to be state
actors in cases in which the final or decisive act was carried out by
a state official."1 54 Justice White concluded that it was not necessary
for the majority to employ an "analytical looking glass" because
Tarkanian was not significantly different from Adickes and Den-
nis.155 It does not matter to the joint participant analysis whether
the private act occurred before a decisive state act or a state act
occurs followed by a decisive discriminatory private act. The only
pertinent fact was that the NCAA was a "willful participant in joint
action with the State or its agents.'
1 56
Justice White opined that UNLV embraced the rules of the NCAA
when UNLV contractually agreed to administer its athletic program
in accordance with NCAA legislation. 5 7 UNLV also agreed that the
NCAA would conduct hearings concerning rule violations and that
152. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
153. Id. at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 466. In Adickes, a police officer committed the decisive act of arresting Adickes for
vagrancy, while in Dennis, a judge issued an improper injunction. In both cases the Court held that
the private parties could be found to be state actors if they were jointly engaged with state officials
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UNLV would be bound by the fact-finding of the proceedings. Al-
though the NCAA did not possess direct authority to suspend Tar-
kanian, through its joint action with UNLV it was able to accomplish
this goal.'58 The dissent argued that there was no difference between
the NCAA in this case and the private parties in Dennis who did
not have the power to grant an injunction, but were able to obtain
that result through their joint agreement with the judge. Here the
NCAA was able to suspend Tarkanian due to its joint action with
UNLV to attain a result that would be beyond its powers acting
alone. As in Dennis, the joint action of the NCAA resulted in the
private association becoming a state actor despite its lack of power
to act individually.
Justice White concluded, even if, as the majority asserted, the
NCAA and UNLV were actually adversaries, that fact does not af-
fect the reality that the two parties nevertheless engaged in the joint
action. 59 Although the parties may disagree, "the key... as with
any conspiracy, is that ultimately the parties agreed to take the ac-
tion.' 60 UNLV agreed to be bound by NCAA rules and fact-finding
proceedings. Although the NCAA and UNLV disputed almost every
matter at every stage of the investigation and subsequent litigation,
UNLV ultimately suspended Tarkanian in adherence to its agreement
with the NCAA. The suspension constituted joint action in fulfill-
ment of the agreement between the parties. Therefore, Justice White
concluded that the NCAA was a state actor and was acting under
the color of state law.' 6'
V. COMMENT
The Tarkanian decision is consistent with the twenty year trend
of the United States Supreme Court limiting the applicability of
Constitutional standards to private actors. The majority retreated
from the broad interpretation of the joint participation theory es-
poused by the dissent and by the Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
158. Id. at 467 (White, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 467-68 (White, J., dissenting).
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Co. 62 The dissent would hold that a private party was subject to
Constitutional guarantees if the party engaged in any kind of joint
conduct with the state.
Tarkanian preserves the dichotomy between private conduct and
state action that is fundamental to American Constitutional juris-
prudence. 1 3 The Fourteenth Amendment generally does not extend
to private conduct abridging individual rights.' 64 This distinction be-
tween private conduct and state action is vital because "it preserves
an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law
and federal judicial power.
'1 65
Tarkanian indicates that in a section 1983 claim alleging state
action, the question must still be whether the action complained of
is fairly attributable to the state.166 Section 1983 cases such as Ad-
ickes and Lugar have indicated that a private party becomes a state
actor where there is joint action between the private party and the
state resulting in the harm. 67 The Tarkanian majority indicated that
the joint participant theory will not automatically apply to convert
a private party, who interacts with government or a state supported
entity, into a state actor. 68 In the final analysis, the action must
still be fairly attributable to the state. 69 The question of fair attri-
bution to the state is a factual question, and "only by sifting facts
and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance. 1
70
The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to eliminate govern-
mental abridgement of rights, 17' and a violation of rights by a gov-
ernment entity is extremely dangerous because the full sovereign
power of government is behind the conduct. 72 A single citizen can-
162. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
163. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 468 (White, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 461.
165. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 946.
166. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
167. Id. at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 465.
169. Id.
170. Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
171. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464-65.
172. Id. at 461.
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not successfully combat the full array of sovereign power utilized
to violate his rights. The government has at its disposal the power
to make a wrongful law, and the coercive police power to enforce
it with impunity.
However, the NCAA possessed no governmental powers which
it could utilize during its investigation and enforcement of rule viol-
ations.173 Because the NCAA lacked the power of the state to compel
Tarkanian's suspension (even under its own rules the NCAA did
not have the power to directly suspend Tarkanian), there was no
exercise of the coercive sovereign power which the Fourteenth
Amendment is designed to limit. 174 The only coercive power at the
disposal of the NCAA was the threat of further penalties against
the UNLV basketball program. The Court properly held that this
was not an instance of state action. 175
The majority analogized ABA rule-making, which is not state
action, with NCAA rule-making: adoption of rules by state entities
such as a state supreme court or a state university is state action
but the original rule-making is not because the state body may reject
the standards. 176 It can be argued, however, that the NCAA wields
a tremendous economic stick against a member university which re-
alistically diminishes the state university's freedom to reject the
NCAA standards. 77 A failure to adhere to NCAA guidelines or with-
drawal or expulsion from the Association would result in the loss
of significant revenues to the university, likely to reach into millions
of dollars for a "big-time athletic program. 178 Tarkanian argued
that the threat of lost revenues effectively left UNLV with no choice
but to accept NCAA dictates; he then argued that the Court should
have held that the NCAA was a state actor. 79
Undoubtedly, powerful private entities such as the NCAA, major
corporations, and other accrediting bodies can wield extensive ec-
173. Id.
174. Id. at 464.
175. Id. at 466.
176. Id. at 463.
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onomic power that can influence state action. However, the existence
of such economic power is not dispositive of the Constitutional ques-
tion of state action. The Tarkanian Court correctly found that even
if the possibility exists that a private party could coerce the state,
the question remains whether the offensive conduct of the private
party is fairly attributable to the state. 80 In Blum, the Court made
it clear that state action does arise when the state uses its power to
coerce or encourage a private party to take a discriminatory action. 181
However, in order for Fourteenth Amendment standards to apply
to a private party, the decision for the private party to discriminate
must originate with a governmental decision.182 Despite the economic
power of private parties, the Constitution serves as a curb on gov-
ernment power and not upon private actors. Private actors are merely
that-private actors-regardless of their economic strength.
An important element of Tarkanian is the majority's rejection
of the joint participant theory espoused by the dissent and the Nev-
ada courts. The dissent argued for a very broad joint participant
standard which would convert any private actor who has joint deal-
ings with the state into a state actor if the state abridges some civil
right in the joint dealings. 183 The dissent's use of the joint participant
theory to find that a private actor is actually a state actor does
violence to the distinction between private conduct and state con-
duct. The dissent asked the question "is there joint action?'" 84 An
affirmative answer would end the inquiry without asking the pivotal
question asked by the majority: "can the action be fairly attributed
to the state?"'8 5
It is unjust and illogical to say that any joint action will trans-
form a private party into a state actor when a private act is followed
by a decisive unconstitutional state act. 86 In the typical state action
case, a finding of state action is appropriate because the private
180. Id.
181. Blum, 457 U.S. at 991.
182. Id. at 1004.
183. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 466-68 (White, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 465.
186. Blum, 457 U.S. at 944 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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actor engages in some conduct that the state coerces or compels. In
such a case, the action may truly be attributed to the state because
the private party is not acting independently, but is acting at the
behest of the government. However, when "looking through the
analytical looking glass," if the private party independently chooses
to engage in some conduct, and in response to the private conduct,
the state acts to violate Constitutional rights, it is not logical to
assert that the initial independent private action no longer retains
its character as a private act, and now may be viewed as state action.
While the state may be properly held accountable for its invasion
of Constitutional rights, it is unjust to impose these sanctions upon
the private party because the state had no part in the original private
action. Thus, the private actor remains a private actor unless the
state uses its power to coerce or encourage the private party to
violate the Constitution.8 7
The joint participant theory has been employed in section 1983
cases involving a conspiracy in which the conspirators set out to
violate a citizen's civil rights.'88 The Tarkanian majority indicated
that the joint participant theory is appropriate in situations where
there is "impropriety" such as the bribery of a judge as in Dennis,
or the collusion of the restaurant owner with the police to exclude
blacks from the restaurant as in Adickes. 89 In both of these cases,
the parties knowingly intended from the start to deprive the plaintiff
of a clear Constitutional right. But the Court found that there was
no "impropriety" under the Tarkanian facts because the initial
agreement between the NCAA and UNLV was not to deprive some-
body of his rights, but merely consisted of the university's accep-
tance of NCAA rules.9 There is no agreement to violate rights
which would make the application of the joint participant theory
appropriate. Justice Powell, writing for the dissent in Lugar, in-
dicated that it may make sense to hold that a private party in a
true conspiracy with the state to violate an individual's rights acts
under color of state law. This is because the individual is inten-
187. Id. at 1004.
188. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 922.
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tionally using, with the cooperation of a state actor, state law to
further his impermissible action.1 91 However, when the application
of the joint participant theory becomes so broad as to include private
actors that are merely invoking state attachment proceedings as in
Lugar, the public/private distinction is totally obscured. The Tar-
kanian Court recognized the importance of the public/private di-
chotomy and properly refused to further extend the joint participant
doctrine beyond its proper bounds.
192
It is important to retain the public/private distinction or else an
important area of personal freedom-autonomous choice-will be
lost. As one scholar notes, "there are essentially private realms,
albeit circumscribed by the state and society, in which actions are
autonomous."'' 93 Within this "circumscribed" area of autonomy, a
191. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 944 (Powell, J., dissenting).
192. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 454.
193. Brest, State Action and Libel Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 1296, 1323 (1982).
The essence of autonomy is the ability of the actor to choose freely. Within the private realm
of autonomy, the private actor is able to choose his course. Sometimes the actor may choose to act
in an unfair manner; although others may not approve of the choice, the individual has the freedom
to make such choices within certain limits. The State Action Doctrine which provides that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not erect a shield against unfair private conduct, preserves this area of freedom
from government intrusion. It must be recognized that any erosion of the private/state dichotomy
in order to enhance the rights of the victim of private discrimination necessarily impinges on the
realm of freedom of the person discriminating. This notion suggests that a balancing analysis may
lie behind the state action cases. One commentator asserts the following:
an examination of "state action" cases reveals that whether the nature and extent of state
involvement in a given case will be deemed sufficient to constitute state action depends
upon the importance of the interest sought to be vindicated by the party claiming discrim-
ination, when weighed against the interests of the person said to discriminate.
Davis, Finding State Action, 26 HowARD L.J. 1395, 1406 (1983).
Thus state action was found to exist when the weighty interest of correcting racial discrimination
was involved. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Under this
balancing analysis, the interest of the victim of racial discrimination outweighed the rights of the
ostensibly private party to discriminate because of race. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1973), however, the Court rejected a state action claim involving racial discrimination. This case
could be distinguished on balancing grounds because the state's involvement in issuing liquor licenses
was so far removed from the alleged discrimination that it could be said that the state was not actually
involved in the discrimination. Thus, in Irvis, the interests of the victim of discrimination did not
outweigh the rights of the private person to discriminate because the state's connection with the
discrimination was too tenuous.
The Court has generally been reluctant to find state action when economic interests are involved.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
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person should be free to make choices- even free to be unfair or
to discriminate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian
continued its trend of limiting the applicability of Constitutional
principles to private parties. 94 In so doing, the Court once again
reaffirmed the distinction between public and private conduct in
Constitutional jurisprudence and recognized the area of individual
private conduct into which the federal Constitutional law will not
intrude. 195
The Court properly found that action by a private party followed
by subsequent state action in violation of the Constitution does not
convert the private actor into a state actor. The joint participant
theory will not be utilized to transform the private actor into a state
actor solely because the private actor acted jointly in some manner
with the state. The final result in state action cases 'depends upon
whether the conduct complained of can fairly be attributed to the
state.
The Tarkanian decision makes it clear that a state action analysis
is inherently and necessarily a factual inquiry that is informed by
no hard doctrine but is guided by various elements derived from
the case law. The analysis involves sifting through the factual sit-
149 (1978); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). A
balancing analysis would suggest that the injury created by the deprivation of an economic right by
an ostensibly private person is not to be given sufficient weight to overcome the rights of a private
person to engage in unfair conduct. Lugar v. Edmondson, 457 U.S. 922 (1980), is an obvious exception
to this trend as a property interest was upheld against a party invoking a state pre-judgment attachmert
statute. This case seems to present a situation that cannot be resolved under a balancing analysis. If
the theory is applied, the interests of the victim of property deprivation would generally not outweigh
the interest of the private party that merely invoked what was an apparently valid statutory process.
Lugar is a problem for the balancing theory.
NCAA v. Tarkanian involves a deprivation of a property right which would place this case within
the economic category above. The Court may have placed more weight on the freedom of choice in
the NCAA rather than in the property rights of Tarkanian. This may be another explanation of the
Court's holding that there was no state action by the NCAA.
194. G. GUrTHER, supra note 43, at 872, 900.
195. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 461.
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uation, case by case, to discern if there is conduct fairly attributable
to the state. 196
The Court found that the action by the state in suspending Tar-
kanian did not result in transforming the NCAA into a state actor.
Subsequent cases involving "analytical looking glass" fact patterns
similar to Tarkanian, where a private action is followed by an act
of the state to violate Constitutional rights, must satisfy the fol-
lowing standard: before the initial private conduct will be deemed
to be that of the state, the private conduct itself must be attributable
to the state. A simple finding of joint action will not suffice to
create state action unless there is also evidence of an improper con-
spiracy to employ state law to violate Constitutional rights.
The current conservative Court will continue to maintain a state
action requirement by demanding actual state involvement in the
acts of a private party before the Court will deem the private actor
to be a state actor subject to the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Stephen R. VanCamp
196. Burton, 365 U.S. at 715.
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